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Bumper crops have quicklyturned the corn and soybeanprice boom into a bust. New-
crop corn and soybean futures con-
tracts are down 40 percent and 35
percent respectively in just a few
short months. Of course, those farm-
ers that had the foresight to lock in
at high prices are completely unaf-
fected by the drop in price. For them,
market volatility has created profit
opportunities. But all is not lost for
the majority of farmers who did not
lock in at those prices. The farm
safety net created by the 2002 Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act
will cushion the financial shock of
lower prices.
It looks certain that Corn Belt
farmers will receive substantial pay-
ments from all three sources of fed-
eral farm support in this coming crop
year. Iowa farmers will definitely re-
ceive more than $512 million in di-
rect payments because these
payments arrive regardless of what
happens to price or yield. In fact, di-
rect payments arrive even if a
farmer’s land remains idle. As indi-
cated by mid-October price levels,
Iowa farmers could also receive al-
most $700 million in countercyclical
payments and about $900 million in
loan deficiency payments. Nation-
ally, corn and soybean farmers
should expect to receive more than
$11 billion in total payments, includ-
ing $2.7 billion in direct payments,
$3.8 billion in countercyclical pay-
ments, and about $4.6 billion in loan
deficiency payments. There is a good
chance that corn and soybean farm-
ers will actually be made “more than
whole” this year. At current prices,
corn and soybean revenue from the
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market and the government is pro-
jected to be about $8.8 billion for
Iowa farmers. In 2003, total revenue
was about $7.5 billion.
Insulating farmers from market
price fluctuations is at the core of
complaints by some of our trade
competitors. The basis for Brazil’s
successful case through the World
Trade Organization (WTO) against
U.S. cotton subsidies was that U.S.
cotton production is artificially
propped up when prices are low be-
cause U.S. cotton farmers have no
incentive to cut production even
when they cannot cover their vari-
able costs of production.
Most farm groups want to obtain
a new WTO agreement in agriculture
because much of U.S. agriculture
stands to gain significantly from ex-
panded export markets. But U.S. farm
programs continue to be a roadblock
to reaching an agreement. Is it pos-
sible to adjust the programs to make
them more acceptable to the WTO
while meeting congressional desires
for a strong safety net? A close ex-
amination of what Congress wants in
a farm bill and how current income
support mechanisms work will dem-
onstrate that the answer could be
yes if Congress continues to be will-
ing to base payments on historical
rather than current acres and yields.
If Congress were to make needed ad-
justments, then U.S. negotiators
could once again take the lead as
legitimate advocates of freer trade.
PURPOSE OF U.S. FARM PROGRAMS
Most people not on the receiving
end of farm program payments
would question the broad public
purpose being served by them. But
Congress keeps passing farm bills, so
the legislation must be designed to
meet some objective. If we assume
that Congress was fully aware of the
intended effects of their policy
choices, then we can look at what
farm programs actually do to discern
why we have them.
The primary effect of farm pro-
grams working in tandem with crop
insurance is to increase average in-
comes and to greatly reduce the fi-
nancial risk of the shrinking subset
of U.S. farmers who grow subsidized
commodities and who own the land
they farm. That is, Congress has cre-
ated a web of programs that together
enhance and protect farm sector in-
come. Thus, determining whether
farm programs can be modified to
enhance the U.S. negotiating posi-
tion at the WTO while continuing to
meet the needs of Congress requires
an understanding of each of the
three primary components of the
farm safety net.
THREE KINDS OF PAYMENTS:
DIRECT, COUNTERCYCLICAL, AND
LOAN DEFICIENCY
Direct payments evolved from AMTA
(Agricultural Marketing Transition
Act) payments in the previous (1996)
farm bill. AMTA payments were sup-
posed to assist farmers as they made
a transition from reliance on subsi-
2        CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT      FALL 2004
Iowa Ag Review
ISSN 1080-2193
http://www.card.iastate.edu
Iowa Ag Review is a quarterly newsletter published
by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment (CARD). This publication presents summarized
results that emphasize the implications of ongoing
agricultural policy analysis, analysis of the near-
term agricultural situation, and discussion of agri-
cultural policies currently under consideration.
Editorial Staff
Sandra Clarke
Managing Editor
Betty Hempe
Editorial Consultant
Becky Olson
Publication Design
Editorial Committee
John Beghin
Trade and Agricultural
Policy Division Head
Roxanne Clemens
MATRIC Managing Director
Iowa State University
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the
basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin,
sexual orientation, sex, marital status, disability, or
status as a U.S. Vietnam Era Veteran. Any persons hav-
ing inquiries concerning this may contact the Director
of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, 1350 Beardshear
Hall, 515-294-7612.
IN THIS ISSUE
Creation of a WTO-Friendly
Farm Safety Net .............................. 1
Pharmaceuticals and Industrial
Products in Crops: Economic
Prospects and Impacts
on Agriculture ................................ 4
Agricultural Situation Spotlight:
Agriculture on Record Pace ......... 6
Strong U.S. Pork Exports in 2004:
The Story Behind the Numbers .... 8
Recent CARD Publications ......... 11
10 Years of the Iowa
Ag Review ...................................... 12
Editor
Bruce A. Babcock
CARD Director
Subscription is free and may be obtained for either
the electronic or print edition. To sign up for an
electronic alert to the newsletter post, go to www.
card.iastate.edu/iowa_ag_review/subscribe.aspx
and submit your information. For a print subscription,
send a request to Iowa Ag Review Subscriptions,
CARD, Iowa State University, 578 Heady Hall, Ames, IA
50011-1070; Ph: 515-294-7519; Fax: 515-294-6336;
E-mail: card-iaagrev@iastate.edu; Web site:
www.card.iastate.edu.
Articles may be reprinted with permission and with
appropriate attribution. Contact the managing editor
at the above e-mail or call 515-294-6257.
Printed with soy ink
dies toward reliance on market
prices. As it became clear that there
would be no such transition, the
name was changed to reflect reality.
Direct payments are fully
“decoupled” in the sense that their
level is not coupled to a farmer’s cur-
rent planting decisions or produc-
tion levels. Because direct payments
are decoupled, they are generally
viewed as having little or no effect
on U.S. production levels. Therefore,
they have little or no effect on U.S.
exports or imports or on world
prices and thus are generally accept-
able to the WTO.
Although direct payments are
paid to the person who farms a par-
ticular parcel of land, their predict-
ability means that they are largely, if
not completely, bid into the price of
land. And because they arrive regard-
less of what happens to price or yield,
their sole impact on farm finances is
to increase incomes of land owners.
Countercyclical payments are
not fully decoupled because they in-
crease when season-average market
prices fall. However, their impact on
farmers’ planting decisions and pro-
duction levels is small because their
level in any year is based on a
farmer’s acreage decisions and yields
in a historical base period. That is,
variations in yield or planted acreage
in the current year have no effect on
the size of a farmer’s payment.
Countercyclical payments do not,
in general, provide support only when
a farmer’s income is low. For those
farmers who have switched crops
since the base period, payments arrive
when the season-average price of a
non-planted crop is low, so there may
be little correspondence between
market receipts and payments re-
ceived from the government. This dis-
connect can also exist even for those
farmers who have not switched crops.
For example, this year’s large yields
mean that farm incomes in Iowa will
be little changed even though prices
are low. So the primary effect of
countercyclical payments is that they
offer some price protection, which
may or may not mean that payments
arrive when farm incomes are low.
The fact that countercyclical
payments are not based on current
production and that they can arrive
when a farmer’s income is not low
actually makes them somewhat ac-
ceptable to the WTO because they
do not necessarily insulate farm fi-
nances from the effects of low prices.
Farmers must look to market prices,
not to countercyclical payments, to
determine whether or not to plant
additional acres of a crop.
There is no redeeming feature of
our marketing loan program in the
eyes of the WTO because it com-
pletely insulates farmers from prices
below a set floor price called the loan
rate. This program allows farmers to
take a loan deficiency payment,
which is calculated as the difference
between the loan rate and a local
price multiplied by harvested produc-
tion. Our trade competitors complain
most bitterly about our marketing
loan program because at planting
time U.S. farmers know with certainty
that the lowest possible price they
will receive for their crop will be the
loan rate. The reason this upsets our
competitors is that these minimum
price guarantees most directly inter-
fere with the natural response of
farmers to change crops or to cut
back on production when produc-
tion costs cannot be covered. The
loan rate program keeps production
in place in low-price years. This addi-
tional production then expands U.S.
exports, thereby further depressing
world market prices to the detriment
of our competitors.
Because both loan deficiency pay-
ments and countercyclical payments
vary with price levels, it would seem
that replacing the marketing loan pro-
gram with an expanded
countercyclical payment program
would be a straightforward modifica-
tion to U.S. farm policy that would
maintain the farm income safety net
while meeting the desires of our com-
petitors. A close inspection of such a
move reveals that this would indeed
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be the case with one exception: those
regions of the United States that truly
should not be producing crops would
no longer have any government incen-
tive to remain in production.
EFFECTS OF REPLACING LOAN
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS WITH
COUNTERCYCLICAL PAYMENTS
Congress could replace the market-
ing loan program with an expanded
countercyclical payment program
by simply calculating the counter-
cyclical payment rate as the differ-
ence between the effective target
price and the season-average mar-
ket price.
For farmers who grow about the
same acreage of crops as was used to
determine base acreage, such a
change would have minimal effects
on their farm finances. In major pro-
duction regions, replacing loan defi-
ciency payments with counter-
cyclical payments would have little
or no impact on planting decisions
because the crops grown in these
regions are most economical to grow
even without government support.
Furthermore, in these production
regions, the variable costs of produc-
tion per unit are well below loan
rates, so elimination of the minimum
guaranteed price would have little
effect on production. If the effects are
so small, why would anybody oppose
replacing the marketing loan pro-
gram with an expanded countercycli-
cal payment program?
In major crop production re-
gions, it is generally the case that low
prices correspond to high yields.
Thus, countercyclical payments —
which are based on a fixed number
of bushels—would likely pay out less
on average than would loan defi-
ciency payments. In addition, many
farmers currently take loan defi-
ciency payments when market prices
are at their lowest, near harvest time.
Thus, some upward adjustment in
countercyclical payment rates would
have to occur if total payment levels
were to be held constant.
A seemingly larger concern is
the impact on the safety net for
those farmers who would respond to
the change in policy by choosing to
plant different crops. This would
create a mismatch between pay-
ments and the price received for the
crop that is actually grown. Thus, a
farmer could be facing quite low
prices with no countercyclical pay-
ment. Or, conversely, a payment
could arrive but the farmer might, in
fact, be enjoying a high-price year.
But the fact that farmers might
choose to switch crops because of
the change in policy indicates a posi-
tive impact on the safety net. That is,
such farmers could expect to receive
the same level of government pay-
ments, and the new crop should give
them higher market returns: other-
wise they would not have made the
switch. Regarding the mismatch, Con-
gress has already shown its willing-
ness to live with a mismatch between
payments and farm income levels.
There is no connection at all be-
tween farm financial situations and
direct payments. Most Iowa crop
farmers have had two good years, but
direct payments keep coming. And
this year, cash receipts will be quite
high because of high yields, but Iowa
farmers will likely received large
countercyclical payments. So a lack
of coordination between farm fi-
nances and receipt of a
countercyclical payment should not
cause Congress too much trouble.
A potentially greater political
hurdle to overcome would be if
many farmers in a region decided
simply to leave land idle and pocket
the direct payment and the counter-
cyclical payment. Landowners might
decide to quit farming if there is no
crop that could cover production
costs, and this could occur for high-
cost crops in high-cost regions. For
example, some cotton land in parts
of West Texas would likely go idle if
cotton farmers were not guaranteed
a price by the federal government.
Low-yielding wheat areas in western
North Dakota are another region
where crop production might fall
significantly. Members of Congress
who represent these regions are the
ones who would be most vocal in
their opposition to replacement of
loan deficiency payments with
countercyclical payments.
Of course, such a transition is ex-
actly what our trade negotiators want
to see happen when they argue for a
lowering of subsidies in the European
Union and a lowering of tariffs and
other trade barriers around the world.
The U.S. negotiating position over the
last 30 years could be summarized as
follows: “Production that takes place
only because of subsidies should be
production that does not take place.”
It only weakens our negotiating posi-
tion when we make this argument to
everybody but ourselves.
A REALISTIC POLICY OPTION?
Farmers, farm leaders, and politi-
cians all seem reasonably satisfied
with current farm programs. This sat-
isfaction suggests that basing a large
portion of farm income support on
past acreage and yields rather than
on current production levels is gen-
erally acceptable. Farm groups
would likely find the path to an ex-
port-expanding new WTO agreement
significantly less bumpy if they
would push the U.S. negotiating
team to offer to complete the
decoupling of U.S. farm program pay-
ments by replacing our marketing
loan program with an expanded
countercyclical payment program.
Such a move would not significantly
alter the financial conditions of U.S.
farms and it would increase the cred-
ibility of U.S. negotiators when they
argue that markets, not government,
should determine what and how
much farmers produce.  ◆
